Posted at 01.10.2018
Indian advertising has been undertaking its role as one of the pillars of democracy, by generating public understanding and voicing thoughts on security matters in the entire national interest. The public judgment on the legitimacy of an operation takes on an important role in the development and sustenance if the nationwide will in addition to giving durability to the political management. Although security of information is a vital issue while doing military functions, the civil human population should be made alert to the details a appropriate time. Public support is a great morale booster for the soldier. It is therefore important that the civil culture is well informed about the truth alternatively than be given with rumours.
2. On the other hand, the armed forces must understand the working, compulsions and restrictions of the media, to ensure relationship leading to synergy. It is not possible in today's world for the military to exclude the marketing yet expect it to project an stimulating image. The organisational composition of the navy is hierarchical in which professional pride and regimental loyalties are intricately interwoven. It generally does not go in line with democracy and adopts authoritarianism in order to be effective in warlike situations. Since it is struggle- oriented, it does not entertain any disturbance from outsiders. Certain legitimately activities done by the military services does not make any sense to civilians who've little awareness about military issues. The military likes to be focussed and remaining alone to handle its allotted activity.
3. All over the world media- military interaction in order to achieve the national goals has undergone significant change. A couple of permanent companies and clear slash policies on the manner where the military operations are covered. Nevertheless the Indian military press policies are obsolete and desire a fresh look in order to be contemporary.
4. The engagement of armed forces in interior security businesses and Low Level Conflicts (LIC) has been increasing in the recent past. Such procedures are against insurgents/militants who are intermingled with the civil society. There were cases where different versions of the case from the military and the civil society have led to controversies. These controversies are lapped up by the marketing and are protected so widely that the truth is never amply revealed. Media needs to be aware of the sensitivity of the situation and exercise do it yourself restraint in order to deal with the problem with maturity.
5. The Gulf Warfare showed the world the magnitude to which multimedia can penetrate the war theatre. Millions around the globe watched the release bombs and missiles destroying goals in Baghdad. Kargil and Afghanistan showed the details of every offensive in real-time. The coverage was a lot more than what was available through the previous wars. It really is now debated whether that which was shown and reported was real or rigged. The primary issue is usually that the advancements in neuro-scientific information technology have empowered the media to repay and affect the businesses to a larger degree.  It is therefore essential to analyse the complicated relationship between the Indian government and the press, and also to understand the whether the Indian mass media is older or is still adolescent.
6. To study the maturity level of Indian marketing coverage through the Kargil warfare and terrorist invasion in Mumbai on 26 Nov 08 in the light of mass media coverage by the global mass media in the recent wars.
7. The level of maturity shown by the mass media of developed nations far exceeds the maturity of the Indian press in reporting battle or conflict like situations. There can be an urgent need in synchronise the procedures of the military services with the Indian press so that both could work towards the achievement of the nationwide objectives.
8. Regardless of being free form federal government control since quite a while, the maturity that is desired form the Indian advertising has not been noticeable. Trivial issues are being given extensive coverage and important issues are being overlooked. Indian media shows recently that the coverage has been irresponsible in confirming military businesses.
9. Press being truly a major device of formulation of general population opinion, it's important that matters relating to military functions are protected judiciously. This entails proper training of mass media personnel in order to operate in the conflict area and, their sensitisation on the issues like secrecy of strategies, deployment and flexibility.
10. Developed countries have embedded marketing in their fighting with each other formations after necessary training. The nationwide media insurance plan is laid down so that what is covered by the marketing is in collaboration with the overall national plan.
11. Indian advertising needs to be brought to the same level if never to a higher level so that Indian military services interests aren't affected by sloppy reporting by the media.
12. The scope of this research is fixed to the role of international and Indian press in within the military operations through the Gulf battle, Afghan warfare Kargil warfare and 26/11 terrorist strike on Mumbai. The opportunity has been held thin because the marketing revolution has took place recently and then the role of the media in future will be dictated by the utilization of the newer varieties of mass communication.
13. Data used for this dissertation has been collected from a huge number of catalogs, periodicals, magazines, publications that exist in the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Catalogue and the internet.
1. The question is often elevated as to who needs whom? Will the multimedia need the armed service or does indeed the armed service need the mass media? The answer is, however, not that simple. Throughout record both institutions have been at odds with each other. The army is perennially popular, but reaches its best in struggle and functions such as a conditioned athlete. However, it too, has its show of incompetence. So when the armed forces makes mistakes, they can be monumental. Besides place, a large quantity of lives can be lost.
2. The military are disciplined, hierarchical and live inside a homogenous, finished culture that may be and often is hostile to outsiders.
3. The news headlines media, are often unpopular with the brass, for they function separately, without rules, regulations, or perhaps a Code of Do except for some that are self-imposed. The media's Newspapers, Radio, TV and Cable television have a variety of hobbies of their own and established goals to be performed. They have their fulsome talk about of rogues, incompetents and avaricious vultures. Yet at their best, the media supply the land with a essential service it can get nowhere else. It is one of the pillars of the state of hawaii.
4. When the two institutions meet during a conflict, clashes are inescapable. The media needs to tell the story, and the armed service wants to succeed the conflict and keep casualties to the very least. The media needs freedom, no censorship, total access and the capability to get their stories out with their people quickly. The armed service on the other hands, wants control. The greatest concern with a armed forces commander in a pre-invasion situation is the fact something might leak out that would tip off the enemy. Normally, too, wonder is the strongest weapon in the Commander's armoury. On the other hand, the media doubts that the military might stifle news coverage for improving their general population image or cover up their blunders. Those are key differences that won't change. Sometimes the armed forces and the patriotic press also have worked together in harmony but usually animosity tarnishes their marriage. There is obviously a need for better understanding between the two. A perfect co-operative union of the media and the navy is likely impossible, given the variations in missions and personalities but there are wise heads in both establishments who understand the mutual need. The advertising is eager for stories while the military need to inform their story. Above all they need open public support. The mass media can inform their history and if there is a rapport and understanding, they can inform it well and effectively. Both organizations will work better during the pressure and the fog of battle if they figure out how to go along in peacetime.
5. Through the wartime when there's a life and fatality struggle for the armed forces, individually as well as institutionally, patriotism comes to their save instinctively and through their long training. Civil media totally lacks such training and has little or nothing personal on the line. Self-aggrandizement appears to be the raison d'etre of most. War is good for the press business. Despite the increased costs of sending correspondents for coverage, using expensive satellite tv equipment and airtime, armed conflict is accurately the type of event which the multimedia thrives. That is an alarming situation then one must be done during peacetime to eliminate this dichotomy.
7. It is for the civil mass media to come onward with the treatment. And for the military services to provide its own media to fill the space and, more importantly to provide as the role model.
8. Many military services leaders have grown to be aware that press coverage of these operations can be a force multiplier. Impressed by Gen. Walt Boomer's exemplory case of encouraging favourable news media coverage of the united states Marines in the Gulf Conflict - to the point where most observers concur that the Marines received more credit than they deserved, usually at the trouble of the US Military - many armed service leaders attended to the final outcome that press coverage not only grows public understanding and the support of armed forces units, it gets the side good thing about boosting their morale by informing their families and friends of the actions of the troops. If used prudently, multimedia is definitely a Pressure Multiplier as it creates public view. In what of Abraham Lincoln:
"General public opinion is everything. With it nothing can are unsuccessful, Without it little or nothing can be successful. "
9. The media gathers its information from various sources:-
(a) Overt options :-
(b) Covert sources :-
10. With communication networks now blanketing the globe and information organisations producing their capability to record from almost anywhere, with new technology such as satellite tv telephones, laptops, digital camera models and other innovations, transmission of news is possible in real time. Soon commercial, high-resolution photographic satellites will be accessible to news organizations. The ability of the news media to photograph a battle area during time of warfare and thereby expose the location of your respective own ground units, boats and airbases could be very detrimental to the nationwide security. This makes censorship nearly impossible.
1. Usually, information security means the military services practice of critiquing a reporter's newscopy prior to his filing to ensure that no information of value to the enemy was released. This system was effectively used during the Second World Battle but now technologies have called into question the complete concept.
2. The "Vietnam Syndrome" leads most Us citizens to assume that they lost the war because of the total freedom given to the mass media in their coverage of the battle. Their pessimistic records tipped the public opinion contrary to the conflict. The stories of atrocities of US troops on My Lai and Iwo Jima and, Jane Fonda's radio speeches from North Vietnam and advertising reports of US casualties stirred open public thoughts and opinions in USA against the Battle in Vietnam.
3. In Desert Storm the Pentagon made a decision to use information security to avoid a Vietnam-like situation. The essential for secrecy was great, because if Iraqi commanders experienced got even an inkling of the US attack plan, they might have repositioned their pushes, jeopardizing the success of the operation and inflicting significantly higher casualties on Allied Makes.
4. The US Government demonstrated the means to blackout the battlefield anytime it so select, even in the occurrence of a huge selection of reps of the World Press. When a television set reporter enjoying the remove folks fighters from a Saudi bottom part began to survey the particular one of the fighter airplane were experiencing mechanical trouble, his satellite tv link was shut down by military electric counter steps. 
5. A British television crew attempted to transmit information to London without the knowledge of the PR specialists. Their transmission was intercepted by an airborne AWACs electric warfare aircraft plus they were promptly arrested for this breach of security. 
6. The news organizations later challenged this process. When the Press was retained away from operations at Grenada and Panama, the mass media actually went to court.
7. Thus in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, better sense prevailed on the armed forces culture of clamping down media information. This has led to an improved design of security at the source.
8. "Security at the source", a preferred procedure, is a relatively new concept in which the military strives to develop a plan as far before the operation as you possibly can in order allowing the news mass media to have extensive access to the full total action. Where feasible, journalists may be accommodated with the fight causes. Each reporter is first accredited and then given the ground guidelines with which he/she is likely to comply. Because they'll be located shoulder-to-shoulder with the soldiers, reporters who got questions about the security areas of the operation could find someone to react immediately without actually submiting their news duplicate for review. In the event the Security at the source notion is to work, certain understanding with the media must be reached:-
(a) They must allow that the army can only effectively hold a finite quantity of journalists in battle operations. A device must be developed in peacetime to determine the effectiveness of reporters.
(b) Information organizations need to more diligently teach their reporters in the area of military procedures. The ultimate way to do this is to invite the marketing for the coverage of peacetime armed forces exercises.
9. In wartime, the media serve a variety of assignments. With information, they can convey a sense of the fighting with each other to a open public divorced from its actual horrors or, with entertainment, they provides a feeling of relief or evade to a consumer more directly engaged such just as a blockade or bombing plan.
10. Because they mediate information about the improvement of a battle to the public, the advertising can serve not just as providers of 'right' reports and information but also as realtors of propaganda and disinformation. It is because the very functions by which warfare reports are obtained at source, packaged by journalists and disseminated to a wider audience are subject to a wide spectrum of influences which range from battlefield censorship to broadcasting requirements, deception and disinformation campaigns, official information coverage and propaganda. They are indeed the pollutants which constitute that overworked idiom: "The Fog of War".
11. Journalists have a front side seat at the making of background which is tragic that by enough time the historians become involved 'that first harsh draft of background' provided by the journalists has been so widely disseminated by the mass media that this becomes extremely difficult to dislodge the contaminants that induced the fog of warfare.
12. A rule of thumb in both world wars was to only show pictures of the opponent dead. Own casualty figures have often been minimized and the ones of the enemy exaggerated. Defeats have simply been omitted or delayed in reporting. Or discussed as "strategic retreats".
13. While still the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, refused release a information that HMS Nelson and HMS Barham possessed sustained serious destruction. In 1971, the news headlines of the surrender of Dhaka was significantly postponed and was relayed only following the pep-talk of PTV programs. The sinking of HMS Sheffield by an Exocet missile terminated by an Argentine Mirage aeroplanes through the Falkland Battle was omitted till it became inescapable to be declared. The semester and recapture of Khafji in the Gulf Battle was constantly misreported. The famous ITN video footage of emaciated Muslim prisoners-of-war, which caused an international outrage in 1992, was restricted on Serbian TV. Zee TV performed hell with the reality through the Kargil crisis.
14. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within the six-month period prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Pentagon, armed forces and media worked together to build up plans that would make the Gulf Battle coverage the most comprehensive wartime news coverage ever sold. It was also the most massive cover-up in history up to now.
15. In the opening nights the US invasion on Iraq, ABC anchorperson Peter Jennings made that which was perhaps a Freudian slip, mistakenly referring to the beginning of "Operation Desert Cloud" somewhat than "Operation Desert Storm". Inside the light of the fact that many of the US military's most breathtaking statements in the Gulf Warfare have since proven to be false, Jenning's slide appears to have been no slip in any way.
16. The issue was not simply that the Pentagon and US supervision misled the multimedia, but that the press generally swallowed without question whatever the military and the US Government dished out to them. They were reduced to the level of stenographers. By enough time the truth began to dribble out in the war's wake, it was too late to erase the dominating image of an inevitable, clean, bloodless, high-tech conflict.
17. USA beckoned Iraq to Invade Kuwait. A little-noted poll in Feb, 1991 revealed attractive gaps in people's understanding of the Gulf Crisis. Only 13 percent People in the usa knew that whenever Saddam signalled he might use pressure against Kuwait, the United States through its enchanting Ambassador in Baghdad acquired indicated in July, 1990 that it could take no action,  which it really had nothing.
18. Saddam wanted to withdraw from Kuwait. As soon as August, 1990, Saddam acquired sent information through diplomatic programs offering to withdraw from Kuwait and release all foreigners in trade for the lifting of the sanctions, guaranteed access to the Gulf, and singular control of the contested Rumailah essential oil field. 
19. Iraq had no motive of attacking Saudi Arabia. Defence and cleverness officials informed the united states administration soon after the Kuwaiti invasion that Iraq got no motive of invading Saudi Arabia. 
20. Iraq posed a significant nuclear and chemical weapons threat. Before the start of Gulf problems, US intelligence officers believed that Iraq would not manage to producing an atomic bomb for at least five years. However in November, 1990, President George Bush started saying that Baghdad will be able to build an atomic bomb in just half a year time insisting that the time to harm Iraq was now. 
21. Iraqi military did not remove Kuwaiti newborns from incubators. Despite scant proof, the allied marketing propagated that Iraqi military removed hundreds of Kuwaiti babies from their incubators, leaving them to die on clinic surfaces of Kuwait City. Seven US Senators invoked the event in their speeches while support the January 12, 1991 quality authorizing war. 
22. Smart Bombs Acquired the War. The world was mesmerized by Pentagon-produced videos of Stealth bombers neatly shedding advanced laser-guided bombs down the airshafts of chosen military targets while mercifully sparing near by schools, private hospitals, homes and mosques. Less than 8% of the bombs utilized by Allied Forces were "Smart" ones and of the 88, 500 tons of munitions slipped on Kuwait and Iraq, around 70% missed their focuses on and caused large destruction to civilian life and property. 
23. The Patriot Missile Performed Flawlessly. Despite tall statements, experts testified prior to the US Congress in spring 1991 that the much-vaunted Patriot missile may have demolished only one of the 90 Iraqi Scud missiles terminated at Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Patriots actually increased the quantity of ground harm as they crashed into of all places! Israeli roadways. 
24. Muzzling Negative Reviews. There was particular attempt to muzzle negative studies. A few examples were quoted previously. There have been numerous other samples. Associated Press (AP) photographer Scott Apple White was handcuffed, beaten, and experienced one of his camcorders smashed when 15 US and Saudi military services police officers descended on him as he attempted to photograph the Dhahran barracks where an Iraqi Scud wiped out 27 G. Is. 
25. Iraqi Casualties. There is wide-spread silence about Iraqi casualties, Greenpeace has computed that 57, 000 to 75, 000 users of Iraqi military died through the Gulf Battle while 3, 000 Iraqi civilians were killed in the air conflict. Tapes of episodes by Apache helicopter pilots which were not released, unveiled Iraqi soldiers being wiped out mercilessly as they were fleeing their bunkers while thousands were gunned down throughout their retreat on the available highway to Iraq. 
26. Saddam Learns from "Vietnam Syndrome". Saddam Hussein discovered his own lessons from the "Vietnam Symptoms". CNN's Peter Arnett, was permitted to remain in Iraq to report on the other side of the war. He was accused by the White House of "Speaking for the Iraqi Government", by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf of "aiding and abetting an adversary" and by Col. Harry Summers, Consumer Affairs advisor of "treason". 
27. Saddam Hussein used Peter Arnett to his own benefits by trying to make a general population outcry in the allied nations by allowing CNN to transfer pictures of the destruction of a Chemical substance Weapons Organic with newly scrawled "Baby Milk Factory" in British, parading captured Allied pilots on Iraqi Television set, declaring their disapproval of the battle and displaying the charred body of a huge selection of civilians killed by Allied air episodes on air-raid shelters. However for Saddam, his ploy did not work. It was merely a drop in the Allied scum tide. Perhaps it helped the Allied propaganda machine by providing a pose of objectivity.
1. We should pull important lessons from the recent crisis in our own garden, Kargil. We must take cognisance of the outstanding use of mass media by India to salvage some pride from the mauling it received on the snowy peaks of Kargil. Kargil became one of the most severe nightmares for India. It not only caught them napping, but also shown their extreme vulnerabilities and resulted in very high casualties. With that said, we should credit the Indians for their resilience and for his or her highly successful press and diplomatic campaign.
2. The way Indian media responded to the problems, mobilized its resources and organized Television programmes, publication reports, analyses, discussions, features, the famous "rogue military" posters and several coverage convinced the entire world that Pakistan was on the incorrect feet and the Indians were the aggrieved party. The Chanakyan concepts of deceit and lies were totally exploited to dupe their own countrymen. To improve their lays and sanitize the Indian open public from the truth, PTV was restricted from Cable sites in India and Pakistani magazines were clogged on the web.
3. They also made a very wise use of the web and dedicated a special Website www. vijayinkargil. com to spread their propaganda. Trained PR officers manned chat sites on the net. We on the other hands, could not kick off an adequate counter episode on the advertising leading. Even their very clear lies and promises of Vijay or triumph could not be uncovered. India did not permit media workers to visit Kargil, Dras or Batalik sectors. Zee Television and the 32 Indian Channels extended to spew venom against Pakistan but we lacked the wherewithal and the stength to take on them upon this extremely volatile forward. Obvious sits like Tiger Hill, the use of Mirage-2000 HUD shows with doctored information were continuously being telecast with serious TV News Channels like BBC and CNN re-transmitting them. 
4. The Kargil Warfare was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public thoughts and opinions in both countries. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic digital journalism in India, the Kargil media stories and warfare video footage were often telecast live on Television set, and many websites provided in-depth research of the warfare. The conflict became the first "live" conflict in South Asia; it was given such detailed marketing coverage that one effect was the drumming up of jingoistic thoughts. 
5. The turmoil soon converted into a information propaganda war, where press briefings given by government officials of each country produced conflicting promises and counterclaims. The Indian authorities placed a temporary information embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocking access to online editions of the Dawn papers. The Pakistani multimedia criticized this apparent curbing of independence of the press in India, while India mass media claimed it was at the interest of countrywide security. The Indian federal government ran advertisements in foreign publications including The Times plus the Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in assisting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner politics support because of its position.
6. As the conflict progressed, multimedia coverage of the discord was more extreme in India than in Pakistan. Many Indian stations confirmed images from the challenge zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf Conflict (one of the shells fired by Pakistan soldiers even struck a Doordarshan transmitting centre in Kargil while coverage continuing). Known reasons for India's increased coverage included the greater number of privately owned electronic digital multimedia in India in comparison to Pakistan and relatively increased transparency in the Indian press. At a workshop in Karachi, Pakistani journalists arranged that as the Indian government got used the press and the people into its assurance, Pakistan had not.
7. The printing marketing in India and abroad was generally sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspaper publishers based in the western and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was mainly accountable for the discord. Some analysts assume that Indian media, that was both bigger in number and even more credible, may have acted as a drive multiplier for the Indian military procedure in Kargil and dished up as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of situations found little support on the planet stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic popularity for its position.
8. Today when no country is still left untouched by terrorism, media's coverage of terrorist activities is fast becoming critical. Warfare on terrorism is a test for the Indian mass media. Just how much should be transmit, whether broadcast of terrorist actions amounts to glorifying terrorism and violence and whether it incites people, creates new recruits and provides promotion to terrorists who seek to grab world attention are subject areas of argument across nations in the post 9/11 world. More so in India after 26/11 Mumbai disorders. 
9. Unlike the authoritative statements of the revisionist historians of battle journalism, press independence and freedom of expression are an edge, not really a handicap, in emergencies. Lays and self-censorship - as the annals of the wars of Vietnam or Iraq and back home in Kashmir demonstrate, are generally of poor counsel and donate to the very national disasters we tried to avert. In the same way a seafaring captain cannot test his vessel when the sea is quiet, so independence of the press must be examined in the heart of a surprise, when our bearings are lost and anguish prevails. Mass media pros and the multimedia on the whole have paid much toll to terrorism in recent years. Dozens of journalists have been intimated, kidnapped and assassinated so that they could be silenced. The number of media professionals wiped out in conflict areas or singularly targeted for assassination remains all too high. Some fall victim to crossfire or mine explosions. Most, however, are deliberately gunned down after discovering themselves as journalists.
Just lately we witnessed a proper coordinated terror episode on Mumbai. There exists increasing questioning of the media's conduct when confronted with such problems and more so after the live telecast of the 60 hour long Mumbai attacks. Concerned over just how many aspects of its operations acquired "jeopardized" due to live on images being transmit by TV through the 6- hour siege, the countrywide Security Officer (NSG) is now pushing for limitations on mass media coverage wherever its commandos are involved to overcome. Having already lifted the problem during its recent conferences with Home Ministry officers the NSG top brass will probably move a written request in this connection, it is learnt.
10. The power is particularly miffed with the way its operations at Nariman House were transmit live. Questions are being lifted over the way Havaldar Gajender Singh fell to a terrorist's bullet at Nariman House. "TV broadcast our commandoes getting from a helicopter on the top over Nariman House. By the time our men got and began taking positions, the terrorists were already waiting for them and opened up flame, " an NSG official said.
11. In contrast, NSG officers said, operations at Oberoi "could be conducted more properly" since Television set channels were kept beyond a one-kilometer radius. "This zone was put under exclusive curfew without access permitted to television set crews, " said an NSG commando leading the Oberoi operations "The operations there took minimal time, slightly below 30 hours, when compared with the other two places, " he said. NSG officers said that while terrorists holed up inside probably didn't have access to live TV images on the second and third day of businesses, they still got mobile phones and were probably getting "instructions" from people observing those live images on Tv set. The media in turn can question the NSG that was there any spokesman of NSG to steer the media? The media demonstrated what they saw. Can you blame them for showing what was going on?
12. The local climate of insecurity generated by September 26 and the subsequent warfare on terrorism, have provided the government with an opportunity to take restrictive procedures which had long been in the pipelines. Some solution restrict "the right to know", with authorities agencies withdrawing information that experienced previously been available to the public. Based on the Columbia journalism Review, the rules of conflict reporting setup by the Pentagon have "never been as difficult" as through the plan in Afghanistan. Steps have also been taken to restrict privacy on the web, including constraints on the use by private residents - but also by individuals rights categories and the advertising - of encryption software to protect their email traffic, also to aid wiretapping by the regulators.
13. Attracts patriotism can be used to muzzle independent mass media, deterring journalists from questioning federal government decisions or insurance policies. Some in the United States, according to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), "found themselves likely to become patriots first and journalists second. " Propaganda and the deliberate propagation of disinformation, a practice in times of conflict, further reduce the media's potential to report quite and effectively. Self-censorship in particularly detrimental to reporters' capacity to research and publish information. In some cases, it is fed by fear of offending public judgment (and publishers) in others by fear of violent reprisals.
1. Conflicting Philosophies. It must be appreciated that there are fundamental conflicts in the basic philosophies of the two institutions. 4 While the military is trained to gain i. e. impose its will by fighting with each other, the multimedia is trained to report what it perceives to be the truth at any cost. To win the military needs to project an image of skill, courage, strength, strength and sacrifice. At exactly the same time it also needs to maintain secrecy of operational ideas and conceal some information both from its foe and its own people. On the other hand the media's role of informing the general public enjoins it to beat secrecy and record even unpalatable but inescapable aspects of conflict, such as blunders, cowardice, exhaustion, suffering, blood and fatality.
2. Differing Positions. On account of their conflicting philosophies as well as different outlooks and encounters both the organizations have come to adopt differing positions on some basic issues. A number of the important ones are:-
(a) Operational Security and Troop Safeness. Both concur that advertising must cover war and operations apart from war while ensuring that media information do not impair operational security and troop safeness. However, the mass media seems that since it is accountable for informing the general public and gets the requisite competence, it must be trusted not to impair these key issues. But the military feels that it is up to the operational commander to decide which piece of information impairs operational security and troop safety. 5
(b)Usage of Battlefield. By virtue of its 'watch dog' and 'recorder of background' roles, the multimedia considers which it deserves to be at the website of turmoil and report independently. While agreeing to the inevitable multimedia existence in the battlefield the military feels that the occurrence of a big number of independently moving reporters on the battlefield isn't only a drain on armed forces resources and time but also impermissible using armed service situations.
(c)Army Image. As the military services considers that the marketing must help out with projecting a good image as it is necessary for winning wars, the marketing feels that this must record both good and bad news, irrespective of the consequences.
General military frame of mind towards the media is characterised by the next :-
(e) Media Behaviour. The general media attitude to the military is characterised by the next:-
3. The imperative of granting the maximum possible independence and access to the marketing for covering functions has been aptly mentioned by none other than Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw. While speaking on the occasion of liberating Lt Gen Depinder Singh's reserve 'The IPKF in Sri Lanka' on 19 Nov 91 at New Delhi, the Field Marshal recalled that in 1971 journalists received full liberty to hide the operations and hence they (Armed Forces) received excellent cooperation. He continuing ". . . on the other hand, everything was held top secret in the IPKF operation. In the event the Press had received full independence and used into self-confidence, the IPKF businesses would have received a good Press" He further deplored that even in anti-terrorist businesses in Assam and Kashmir a higher degree of secrecy had been maintained.
Why the armed forces needs the marketing was already explained earlier. In addition to the people essentially armed service reasons there are a few more basic reasons as to why the media must be given access to the battlefield in a democracy. These are8:-
Free press bestows the following benefits to the national cause9:-
Having said very much for a free press on the battlefield it remains to be said that every flexibility has certain restrictions. In India such curbs are sanctioned by Clause 2 of Art work 19 of the Constitution. The primary known reasons for imposing certain adjustments over the press on the battlefield are:-
Overdose of the greatest of medicines may kill. Likewise excessive limitations on marketing have profound sick- effects. A few of them are:-
8. Advertising Training for the Military. Even though press training is a much discussed subject there is hardly any of real training an officer undergoes let alone troops. The first rudimentary lessons of press handling are taught only at the Defence Services Staff College or university. Even the officers preferred for a tenure in the DPR undergo only a familiarisation training for six weeks including a limited period of attachment with news companies or leading reports papers. Up to now there is no formalised system of training formations in multimedia managing during exercises. On the other hand in USA, the Joint Readiness Training Centre, Fort Chafee has been executing 'Media on the Battlefield' training for soldiers since 1990. Mass media training has been contained into their combat training. Media associates (performed by their Community Affairs workers) seem during exercises to interview troops and commanders. The interviews are videotaped and played out back again later to bring out lessons.
9. Training for the Press. A new was made in this direction when the DPR started out the Warfare Correspondents Course of six weeks duration for the national media. From 1995- 96 onwards this program has been tossed open to the regional advertising too. The course provides a primer on the three services, which is not really satisfactory for a defence correspondent. Field training by way of incorporating the marketing in exercises is also not conducted.
10. The drawbacks in the mass media policy are the following.
11. Statement of Coverage. It is essential for the Army to formulate a thorough media insurance policy. The media insurance plan must be in support of the army's actions during battle, LIC/CI operations, and peacefulness, and must consider press requirements after consulting eminent mass media personalities. The advertising plan should:-
12. Evolution of Coverage. It's important that the multimedia itself be studied into confidence while evolving such a policy. Considerable and so far as possible open debate and discourse with eminent multimedia people, PR experts from the industry, organizations including the Press Council of India and academic bodies involved with teaching mass communications must precede declaration of the press policy.
13. Feedback System. The Army must institute a normal opinions system to gauge the effect of marketing coverage of defence related issues on different categories of audience viz residents from different locations and strata, troops and families of troops. Well known private organisations may need to be requisitioned to perform opinion polls among people at intervals of energy. Military Brains (MI) Directorate must institute steps to get immediate feedback from soldiers and their own families. These details must form the basis for formulation of advertising objectives and collection of propaganda topics and mass media.
14. Transparency and Press Private pools. Transparency must form a area stone of the marketing policy as it will lead to higher open public understanding and awareness which will lead to better appreciation and open public self-confidence on the military. This openness must be reflected in positive encouragement to the press to cover functions and exercises without endangering operational security and troop protection. An affective way of reaching this is by building 'Media Swimming pools' at different levels from services head office to corps. These private pools must be composed of certified and security-cleared associates of different countrywide and regional advertising and nominated by their father or mother organisations. These pools must be activated during warfare, low intensity issues and battle and placed in readiness to be changed to the world of action at brief notice. Such a system will assist in the media to repay operations in remote locations by being present at the world of action, which it cannot normally do and at the same time facilitate the military in planning for, handling and supporting media without reducing on security.
15. Accreditation of Defence Correspondents. Essential qualifications for defence correspondents, such as a degree in defence studies and the Warfare Correspondents course must be produced mandatory for a journalist to be certified as a defence correspondent. The accreditation must be examined periodically at which time other conditions such as attendance of an refresher / specialisation course must be insisted upon. Efforts must be made to grant accreditation to satisfactory number of reps of regional marketing, especially in areas influenced by or getting the potential for low intensity conflicts.
16. Self Restraint by Advertising. Personal restraint by mass media is any day better pre-censorship and will only enhance press credibility. A set of sensitive issues which the press must exercise restraint and various packages of security recommendations for covering defence issues during peace, exercises, low strength conflict and warfare must be developed in appointment with the mass media and notified to the mass media and their organisations including the Press Council of India.
17. Joint Security Review. A system of joint security review must be worked out in consultation with the Press Council of India and eminent press persons to replace the machine of pre- censorship during calmness and operations. This may go a long way towards enhancing the reliability of the armed forces.
18. Budget and Resources. The PR budget of any defence establishment of the size must be increased manifold. As the word goes "If you pay peanuts you get only monkeys". The expenses on the monthly 'Sainik Samachar' printed in 13 languages can be reduced without affecting its readership through the elimination of a few of the language editions and changing it into a broadsheet. Alternatively expenses on training and provision of resources such as range of PROs, their transportation, equipment and marketing communications needs to be enhanced.
19. Rapport with Advertising. A conscious effort needs to be made to build up a rapport with media at all levels and way more at the level of older commanders and staff officers. Interaction by means of organising workshops and guest lectures, mutual appointments, inviting articles of eminent mass media people in professional military services publications and writing documents for professional mass media journals must be encouraged in any way levels as a subject of policy. Such an insurance plan will pay good-looking dividends in the longer perspective.
20. Official Secrets Action. Section 5 of the state Secrets Act 1923 must be revised to include the damage probable of a bit of information as the overriding factor in determining if its discloser and recipient are guilty. Such a suggestion has already been created by the Press Council of India in 1982 and 1990. Such a step will be a large stride towards reputation of the 'right to know' in a democracy.
21. Training of PROs. Upon selection for the Corps of PR all officials must be placed via an orientation course in multimedia interaction for length of three to half a year. The syllabus and course material must be advanced in consultation with leading management institutes, Indian Institute of Mass Marketing communications and press organisations including the Press Council of India. The faculty must also be attracted from these organisations. This course should be accompanied by an attachment with different types of mass media organisations, such as newspaper publishers, periodicals, cable services, radio and tv set for an interval of up to half a year. A refresher course must be compulsory after another five to six many years of service. All officers must be urged to obtain degrees in mass marketing communications, pr and journalism. Specific officers can be delivered to leading institutes. These officers must continue steadily to attend all biceps and triceps courses as relevant for others. PR items must be exercised in all formation level exercises and war games.
22. Training of Other Officers. Media and its handling must form part of the curriculum by any means stages associated with an officers career beginning with pre-commission trained in the academies to post-commission trained in all arms courses right up to older levels. Commands and Corps must also keep cadres and seminars on this subject matter for the good thing about other officers. Innovative methods of mass media training must be included in all exercises and warfare -video games for commanders and staff officers.
23. Training of Soldiers. Dealing with marketing must form a part of various promotion cadres for Non Commissioned and Junior Commissioned Officers. In addition soldiers must be briefed regularly and practised in managing media persons during exercises.
24. General Staff Pamphlets. All aspects of media interaction by the military including the role and aftereffect of media in various businesses must be released as a General Staff publication. Current group of publications on 'Businesses of Conflict' and 'Counter-top Insurgency' must be modified to incorporate a section on 'mass media' in each procedure.
25. Training of Media Persons. Attempts must be produced in consultation with the Press Council of India, various advertising organisations, University Grants Payment and leading colleges conducting programs in journalism to incorporate defence awareness programmes and specific areas of defence journalism in their curricula. Range of the Battle Correspondents course must be enhanced and it should be made a compulsory prerequisite for accreditation as a defence correspondent. An advanced/ refresher course should be made for interested mature defence correspondents. Training should also be imparted by including media in various creation level exercises and warfare- game titles.
26. Press Advisory Committee. The Union Authorities must appoint a multidisciplinary committee comprising leading personalities in different media, academicians in the domains of sociology, mindset and political science, senior retired service officials, bureaucrats and police officers to recommend it on effective advertising and information regulations. Such a committee will prove to be of tremendous value in struggling with the low power conflict on the psychological planes effectively. The multimedia, both private and authorities handled, must cooperate entire heartedly with such a committee.
27. Press Council of India. This must be enlarged to include eminent people with experience in the fields of defence and countrywide security, ideally retired older service officers. Its forces must be increased to permit it to progress and enforce a code of conduct. Training of journalists must form part of its responsibility on the lines of Indian Medical Connection.
28. Broadcasting Council of India. This must be set up on similar lines as the Press Council and also have television set and radio in its scope. Video magazines must be contained in its ambit.
29. Recognition of Defence Issues. The media must improve its awareness of defence related issues by making concerted efforts with the DPR or its successor. It must utilise every opportunity to interact with the defence services by using seminars, courses and trips.
1. After assimilating the role of the advertising in battle, and getting a view of the impact of technology on reports reporting, the role played out by multimedia in two recent issues, it must raise questions in our brain that whereas the military trains hard and well to achieve its goals and reach an even of specialization yet we call after the marketing, which is perhaps the only job which begins its occupation with zero specialization and most reporters have no idea the difference between a business and a brigade, a destroyer and a Fleet Tanker or an F-16 and M-16, to tell the storyplot of the armed service. This is all the more valid because of the overall degree of education inside our country.
2. That makes it even more critical for building greater harmony and understanding. We will keep capturing ourselves in the foot if we don't understand the potentials of media as a force multiplier and a weapon of war. Failing to identify and counter enemy usage of press may lead to avoidable armed forces failures. We should realize that decisions are no more based on occasions but on how the incidents are offered. So we must lay greater emphasis on the role of press in battle and train for it in peacetime.
3. No country has yet think of a completely satisfactory mass media coverage on terror. However there are a few examples for us to check out. The British Broadcasting Firm (BBC) has an exemplary set of reportage recommendations for Conflict, Terror and Emergencies. Phoning for reportage to be quick, accurate and responsible, BBC guidelines demand proper terror lexicon, avoidance of the term terrorist and use of words which specifically describe the perpetrator such as "bomber", "attacker", "gunman", "kidnapper" "insurgent, and "militant" instead. Since the disorders on the London Underground in July 2005, reporters are exhorted not to play with the thoughts of the audiences by confirming on occurrences in a sensational manner. Suggestions say that 'if we get a bomb caution or other credible and specific risk whether by phone, fax, email or text message, or even submitted to a note board or received by tape, the first main concern is to complete it on to the appropriate authorities. We should not reveal the existing code words normally used by groups presenting bomb warnings. We ought to not expose security details or other hypersensitive information not greatly in the public domain which might assist an assault - concern areas that the Indian advertising seems to have glossed over completely.
In a similar, but not as detailed fashion, US public broadcaster PBS (Consumer Broadcasting Service) identified a set of Editorial Expectations and plans in the 1970s. This was completely modified in June 2005 in the post 9/11 circumstance to help expand increase transparency. Under the proceeding of "Unacceptable Development Practices". reporters and their camera crews are admonished to refrain from covering terrorist's activities or similar expresses of emergency as soon as it becomes noticeable that their existence influences the outcome of the events themselves.
4. The USA PATRIOT (United and Strengthening America by giving Appropriate Tools Necessary to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Work instituted after 9/11 offers overriding capabilities to the federal government and its wide terms of the energy mean that it could be used against basically anyone criticizing the united states Administration's approach to combating terror. The advertising pledged to acquire formal authorization before interviewing "terrorists" on air live, ban journalists from operating as self-employed mediators throughout a crisis situation, keep an eye on the tone of the coverage, and adhere to a series of other constraints.
5. The Mahinda Rajapaksa Federal government in Sri Lanka - a nation that has experienced the scourge of terrorism for a long time - on Oct 10 this past year notified a new group of norms to modify all aspects of private tv set broadcasting, including classification of channels and services, concern, revocation, and duration of licenses, fee composition, territorial coverage, ownership, tasks and responsibilities of private television broadcasters, content of broadcasts, and prolonged forces of the ministry.
6. More printer ink equals more blood, declare antiterrorists specialists who say that papers of coverage of terrorist happenings leads right to more attacks. It's a sad example of win-win in what they call "common-interest game". Terrorists get free publicity for themselves and their cause. The press meanwhile makes more income "as reviews of terror disorders increase magazines sales and it viewers". Therefore the summary-- coverage cause more disorders, and attacks brought on more coverage-- a mutually beneficial spiral of death that they say has increased because of a heightened curiosity about terrorism since September 11. 2001. One partial solution; deny organizations promotion by not publically naming the attackers. But the question can be asked won't the attackers become known because of informal channels such as the Internet? Definitely not, encounters show us that in virtually all circumstances several groups lay claim responsibility for a specific terrorist strike.
7. While India is yet to style its group of recommendations on coverage of terrorist acts despite such strikes every couple of months, it is about time that we achieve this in right earnest. This will be the very best priority of another government when it comes to ability.
(a) Impacts of Nuclear Power by S Kumar (2009)
(b) Nuclear Reactor Technology by S Kumar (2009)
(c) Nuclear Proliferation by S Kumar (2009)
(d) Indo-Us Nuclear Package: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism -
by PR Chari (2009)
(e) India in a changing Global Nuclear Order - Editor Arvind Gupta (2009)
(f) Energy Security -Editors DR Parag Diwan & Dr AN Sarkar (2009)
(e) Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi June, 2007/Asadha, 1929 (Saka)
(f) www. meaindia. nic. in
 Columnist Gp Capt SULTAN M HALI
 Kennedy, William V. , The Military and the Media-Why the Press Can't be Trusted to pay a War, Praeger Publishers, West Dock USA, 1993, p. x.
 Taylor, Philip M. , The Conflict and the Marketing, Keynote address at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1995.
 Gottschalk, Marie, 'Operation Desert Cloud: The Multimedia and the Gulf Battle, World Plan Journal, p. 451.
 Ibid. , p. 471
 Gittings, John, ed. , Beyond The Gulf Conflict : The Middle East and THE BRAND NEW World Order, London: Catholic Institute for International Relationships, 1991, p. 6.
 Royce, Knut, 'The Butchery of Baghdad', Newsday, January 27, 1991.
 Lewis, Paul, 'U. N. Experts Now Say Baghdad Was Far From Making an A-Bomb Before Gulf Battle', New York Times, May 20, 1992.
 Emmons, Garry, 'Did PR Company Invent Gulf Reports', NOWADAYS, January 22-28, 1992.
 Gellman, Barton, 'U. S. bombs Missed 70% of Time', Washington Post, March 16, 1991.
 Los Angeles Times cable service, 'Analysis : Patriots Missed', NY Newsday, March 1, 1991.
 Fialka, John J. , Hotel Warriors : WITHIN THE Gulf War, Washington DC : Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1991, pp. 56-57.
 Balzer, John, of the Los Angeles Times, cited in William Boot, 'The Pool', Columbia Journalism Review, May-June 1991, p. 26, and(fn1) p. 23
 Schechter, Danny, 'Gulf Battle Courage', Z Magazine, December, 1991.
 Columnist Gp Capt SUL