Identity theory argues that the mind is equivalent to the brain and that mental incidents are identical to brain events, ultimately the theory enlightens materialism for the reason that everything is physical and to further precision it enlightens material monism in thinking that only materials substances and their states are present (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 65). Somewhat it exemplifies physicalism that humans are totally material beings that can be explained using ideally complete physics which it is vital to point out do not presently exist. The idea in summary areas that whenever we experience something inside our minds it'll be identical to an event in the brain, for example pain will be experienced at the same time as the firing of c-fibres in the mind (Gareth Southwell, 2009, http://www. philosophyonline. co. uk). In this essay I will further discuss the different variations of the id theory such as type-type and token-token. And I'll show that despite strengths such as explaining why changes in the brain through injury or otherwise accompany modifications in the mental performing no version of the personal information theory of brain are ultimately satisfactory due to its inability to make clear the locations of thoughts or emotions, the unconscious or conscious areas, the qualia of encounters or the intentional mental claims with further critique by the North american philosopher Kripke.
There are two types of personal information theory and the first one I am going to discuss is the type-type identity theory. This theory believes that any given state of mind will be similar to a brain condition (K. T. Maslin, 2009, 68). This theory tries to identify the connection of mental phenomena with physical procedures in the brain. This theory utilises the discoveries of science as identical with the possible contacts of mental claims with brain expresses, it declares that the discovery of water as an factor of oxygen and hydrogen as well as the recognition of physical phenomena such as lightning with the pattern of electronic discharges it can connect the knowledge and sense of pain with the physical process in the mind and central nervous system of the firing of C-fibres. The expansion of the theory places impetus on reductionism. This is where it is argued that the meanings of different mental and physical phrases exactly match at their main concepts. This can be explained in terms of drinking water and H20, two groups of phenomena that show up numerically contrasting turn out to be one set of existents rather than two. Ultimately they state that mental and physical ideas will grow to be a single kind of property explained by two different terminologies. They consider the true aspect of phenomena can be provided by the base to which it is reduced for example pain can be reduced to the behaviour of neurons in the central stressed system.
The second kind of individuality theory is the token-token personal information theory. This believes there are specific differences in people and animals for brain and mental state governments (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 70). It claims that while token mental expresses are indistinguishable to token physical state governments in different individuals they might be different types of areas, for example pain may bring about c-fibre stimulation in a single specific and z-fibre stimulation in another (Dr Crawford, 2009, 3). Personally, i feel that this theory attempts to make clear the dissimilarities in individuals heads in expansion of the pain example I really believe this theory attempts to explain the various threshold in pain for different individuals, whilst it still may be the same mental thought and brain reactions it takes some people more whilst others less pain to trigger the stimulation of their corresponding fibres whether it be c, x or y.
Firstly I will discuss the strengths of these theories in describing that the mind is ultimately the mind. Firstly it is a simple theory, with fewer assumptions in support of requiring to explain the physical it creates itself more preferable and leaves less loopholes open for critique. It also removes the mind body interaction problem, whereas before there was a need to make clear the mental to physical causation the theory claims that the mental is the physical so it only requires the physical to physical causation to be rationalised and not the non-physical with the physical. Another power is provided by methodical discovery in the utilization of Dog or cat or MRI scans that show that specific regions of the mind "light" during specific mental functions, some of these connections were discovered by Borca and Wernicke over 100 years before the creation of the state-of-the-art scanning techniques, this exhibits the connection between mental and brain states (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 70). However essentially the most powerful of most strengths to the personal information theories is the capability to make clear why changes in the mind due to injury, disease, illness or elsewhere leads to the alteration of mental working. Precisely the same happens along the evolutionary level where rises in brain sizes resulted in the increase of intellectual capacity. As the mind is the mind when the mind is modified the mind is revised (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 66).
There were some early objections to the theory as well where critiques stated that because mental states are different to brain claims analytically they need to vary but theorists quickly dismissed this stating that "the non-synonymy of expressions flanking an identification sign does not automatically eliminate the truth of the individuality claim" in other words because the expressions or conditions are different doesn't meant they cannot possibly have the same identification. To use this further the theorists state that it all depends on what you are discussing, underneath the different vocabulary the reality relate to an individual reality. The example of the morning and evening personalities supports this notion that as the vocabulary and specifically adjectives used to describe the star differ they finally refer to a similar thing the earth Venus. This can be applied to having less knowledge as dismissible critique using Smarts concept stating that you might know about a very important factor but little or nothing about another doesn't indicate they cannot possibly be the same, for example you may know about drinking water but not recognise the element of H20 but this won't mean they are not the one and solitary entity (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 74).
The strengths recognized in the collective identification ideas show some serious contacts identified and supporting evidence shown in proving your brain is indistinguishable with the brain. However I believe there are a few serious and unsurpassable flaws in the quarrels of the personal information theorists that result in its ultimate demise. Firstly, the issue of the mental and the spatial arises (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 74). Whilst it is straightforward through the use of scanning, the positioning of brain techniques can be easily recognized during various duties it is almost impossible to recognize the location of a thought or sentiment, quite simply mental states are different to brain operations. . Secondly, there's a weakness in the bond between mental areas and brain processes on the subconscious level (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 76), to increase this we mean that things like the natural performing of the nervous system as well as any other system in your body such as digestion or respiration, these all have brain areas that tell your body how to proceed however they do not have any connectable mental state because we do not think about them in any way. This demonstrates some things just have physical properties and hence not everything has a mental and a brain point out fundamentally disagreeing with the personality theory. Finally is the issue of qualia which means the grade of a mindful experience (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 79). Whilst we might know what area of the brain there may be activity in throughout a particular mental state there is no way we can access the qualia of this experience, for example if we had a pain we can identify this by the firing of c-fibres inside our brain talk about but there is absolutely no way we're able to identify where that pain is, this means that while we experience thoughts and sensations they must exist in other forms than simply physical properties of brain areas and processes. 1 day science might be able to identify the qualia of an event but at this time we can only identify the mechanical process and cannot clarify mentality or consciousness. Another critique of the identity theories emphasises the importance of dreams, values, desires and so many more intentional states that do not can be found, they have got a representational content and the theorists think that brain expresses are totally mechanical procedures in brain areas that cannot posses any representational content, this requires the drawing of the conclusion that brain states cannot be indistinguishable with intentional mental claims (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 80). The ultimate main critique of all identity theories is because of Saul Kripke who used Descartes sixth mediation as ideas for his discussion in stating that because we can truly imagine mental claims without brain state governments then they are not identical by any means, what something may appear to be is not necessary to its being but its interior constitution is made for example something may be a clear liquid in appearance but it could have all the chance in being vodka as it is water the only way to identify it is to reduce it to its inner constitution H20 (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 90 and J. J. C. Smart, 2000, http://plato. standford. edu/entries/mind-identity). The mere likelihood of event of mental states without the hooking up brain states means they can not be identical. In the end there is a great deal of physical to mental solutions and interconnection that can't be disproved just as they cannot be approved and this draws the conclusion that you 'cannot discover the truth about certainty based on what one does indeed and does not know' (K. T. Maslin, 2007, 67).
In final result despite all the strengths of the individuality theories such as the discoveries of science with Family pet and MRI scans and the reason of changes in the mind leading to changes in mental functioning ultimately the weakness in finding or explaining thoughts, thoughts, dreams, wishes, the subconscious or any qualia of experience, representational or elsewhere, suggest its mechanical strategy ceases to enhance and that is why I believe your brain is not the brain.
- Crawford, Dr Sean. 2009. Lecture Records Week 3: Brain Brain Identity Theories, University or college of Manchester: Blackboard.
- Maslin, Keith T. 2007. An Benefits to the Philosophy of Brain, Second Release, Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Gareth Southwell, 2009, "Personal information Theory", http://www. philosophyonline. co. uk/pom/pom_indeitity_introduction. htm