A basic belief for many people is the theory that we have confidence in something which has not been corrupted by other values to improve the core perception we initially have about certain things. They are not inferred from other values and is well known better as Foundationalism. Out of this is the idea of a simple empirical belief, a opinion that is learned by watching it using our empirical knowledge; vision, hearing, touch etc. To try and understand beliefs more clearly and grasp what knowledge is without empirical values, if it can happen, I will check out Foundationalism its counter argument Coherentism and the essential idea of empirical/sensory belief. Foundationalism considers that people need a core set of beliefs, beliefs that our other beliefs we have are built upon in order to make the original notion are more real.
Most folks have a foundationalist notion structure and our basic beliefs can be justified by values that link to it to make it more factual and the basic belief makes the beliefs which link in with it justified. However, this doesn't mean that they themselves are justified, that the basic notion, if true, makes the values that stem from it justified. Following from having a simple idea, The Regress discussion/Trilemma places across that a opinion is justified by another notion which is justified by another, then another and so forth. So a) It continues on permanently, b) Ends with a few of the beliefs justify themselves, c) Ends with a few of the values having no justification. Therefore, if it went on forever it might be a vicious group and conclude having no end or starting. It really is a 'vicious regress', which Lewis discusses further, if you believe in the chance of something taking place or being true is small, then you do not really consider it because to possess perception in something you need to be in a position to justify it, if nothing can be certain then how do we know anything? However the notion of regress can be reversed if something is for certain and we have confidence in it, so some values must be certain. In Agrippa's Trilemma, the next option relates to Coherentism, which is an alternative discussion to Foundationalism.
Coherentism considers that if there may be now way to justify our empirical sense beliefs, and if the theory that beliefs can be justified by one another forever is ruled out then the values can only just be justified by their particular properties with regards to other beliefs and exactly how well they fit together in order to make a organised system of beliefs. Regularity is a requirement of coherence, but a set of beliefs do not need to have defects to have no coherence, beliefs, that are perfectly consistent, could also haven't any coherence. As said in Agrippa's Trilemma, beliefs justify themselves rather than going on forever, this is shown by the idea that when a belief was to be justified by another belief and so forth, then empirical justification movements in a circular movement. But, Coherentism steps away from this idea and towards the thought of a linear movement and that the opinion is a line, with the order of epistemic priority at the beginning and epistemic justification at the other end of the collection. The belief justifies itself then, as it does not have to have another idea to rely onto it to make it justified.
Moving on out of this, having empirical beliefs means to have knowledge of our values by increasing it through our senses. Foundationalism believed that basic beliefs were infallible, but by looking at Infallible sensory beliefs, what we imagine to be witnessing might not be infallible after all and most of our values make us sure of our sensory beliefs. So it seems that people cannot have beliefs without our senses. For example, the notion in a faith, a God, that England are the best at Rugby, each one of these beliefs can't be justified unless we've our sense to show so. Furthermore, we can't have these beliefs to commence with unless we use our empirical knowledge to understand what we imagine. If we'd no perception then we could not read Holy Scriptures, which reveal religions, if we had no reading then we're able to not hear classical music which you may believe that to be the best music made by man and so forth. Our empirical knowledge is intertwined strongly with our beliefs, and when we were unlucky to not have the ability to use all our empirical senses also to have 1 of these recinded, this still hinders our chances of having a true perception in something and having the ability to justify it. However, a opinion can make us more certain of our sensory values e. g. I think I thought a spider find my backside. Later we discover it was a feather duster. Why can't other beliefs lower how sure we live of your sensory values? If we are to accept the building blocks of sensory beliefs, how exactly does this relate with the belief structure?
Following on from empirical values is a priori knowledge. It is common to most that the knowledge we hold comes from experience, experience we gain through using our senses. Our experience is not doubted which is accumulated by using 'organic material of the smart impressions', our empirical knowledge is made by our interpretations of our very own knowledge. A priori knowledge is completely different from this, it generally does not result from experience, and it comes from innate knowledge we have been created with. In example, 'a man who undermined the foundations of his house, that he could have known a priori that it would fall season, that is, that he need not have waited for the experience of its genuine falling. ' A priori knowledge is completely different from experience, its other being posteriori, knowledge through experience. With beliefs, we modify what we realize from posteriori and a priori knowledge to justify and understand what we know about our beliefs.
Before we live born are we have been believed to have this past knowledge, which Piaget discussions of with regards to conscience and children. A kid develops inner representations or mental and physical activities, some Schemata that are already present in a newborn, such as sucking, gripping and crying. Others develop as the kid expands. The Schemata are designed through 2 functions: 1. Assimilation- appropriate newly obtained knowledge into what the kid already understands. 2. Accommodation-as new activities happen which do not fit into existing schemata, the kid adapts them t fit, or creates new ones. This is similar to beliefs and knowledge, we can have a priori understanding of a religion, such as a blueprint inside our mind of a God and we can build on our notion of this by using empirical knowledge to know more about any of it and by adapting that which you already know and interpreting it with our senses.
Overall, quarrels show that mainly, if we cannot have empirical values then we would find it hard to now anything. Our senses play a huge part in creating thoughts of notion, and without them it is hard to understand what beliefs can be justified if we were to for example haven't any sight or hearing. We'd not be able to have confidence in a religion, except for the idea that people have a priori understanding of a God. However, the basic belief of this is not enough to justify it and requires other beliefs to justify it, so this makes it hard for us to know anything. Or for example, anything true. I believe that we cannot know anything other than what we are innately given birth to with, but this knowledge alone is insufficient to create values or natural knowledge, which solidifies these values. Our empirical senses are key to establishing that which you consider and whether we can justify them further therefore without empirical beliefs we can know nothing sufficient.
Bibliography
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge- Lawrence Bonjour 1986. London, Harvard University Press, ch. 5
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. - Immanuel Kant 1929. Norman Keep Smith, NY, St. Martin's Press, 41-55
Piaget and the Foundations of Knowledge- Lynn S. Liben 1983. Lawrence Erlbaum Affiliates, Hillsdale, NJ, ch. 6
