INTRODUCTION
1. Since WW 11 to 1970s cool war periods, USSR and US develop electronic battlefield targeted to increase their military capabilities made to offset one another. The scopes of military planners in those days were concentrated in SEAD, control, control and communication countermeasures (C3CM). They express this military electronic activity as EW or electronic digital warfare and the platform that encompassed the electromagnetic action required to support modern military operation is termed as Electronic Combat (EC).
2. Classification of EW. EW can be define as a armed forces action involving the use of digital energy to ascertain, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which preserve friendly use from it. It requires ESM, ECM and ECCM.
a. ESM is Electronic Support Solution. It require action try search, intercept, identify and discover radiated electromagnetic energy to provide digital warning and surveillance data for the commander.
b. ECM is an electric countermeasure. It's require the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to strike staff, facilities and equipment with the intent of protecting against or lowering an opponent's effective use of the electronic spectrum. You will discover active and passive sub-categories of ECM the following:
(1) Electronic jamming.
(2) Electronic deception.
(3) Electronic neutralization.
(4) Chaff and flare.
(5) Towed and expandable decoys.
c. EPM is an electronic protection solution or sometime referred to as ECCM (Electronic counter-counter solution) involve dynamic and passive actions taken to ensure the friendly use of the electronic digital magnetic variety despite an opponent's use of electric warfare techniques.
AIM
3. The aim of this paper is to review and evaluate the employments of EW by both countries between Argentina and Britain during the Falkland war. We hope RMAF are certain to get the lessons learnt from this war and apply it to the pushes.
SCOPE
4. The opportunity of the paper will cover the following:
a. History of the Falkland War.
b. Applications of EW during Falkland Warfare by both nations.
c. Lessons learn and Tips.
d. Finish.
BACKGROUND OF THIS WAR
5. The Falkland Islands or the Malvinas are a group of islands situated over 400nm from the eastern seacoast of Argentina and about 8000 kilometers from Great Britain. The islands consists of two main islands, East Falklands and West Falklands and about 200 smaller islands that developed a total land regions of about 12, 200 square km. The capital city of the Falklands Island is Slot Stanley.
6. A glance at the history of the hawaiian islands and United kingdom/Argentine relations has an answer, as the series of events seeing to the overdue 1600's arranged the historical precedence for the issue. No one is aware who saw the hawaiian islands first but the first man to create foot on the islands was a British seaman, Captain John Strong in 1690. Strong did no more than chart the sound between the two main islands and labels it following the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Falkland. Then sailed away.
7. To make the storyline short, the dispute between British and Argentina in the Falkland Islands and its own dependencies had a brief history so long as that of Argentina herself. The dispute continuing, unnoticed by the earth, for greater than a century. For much of that time, the Argentine federal made periodic recognized statements to indicate which it still considered the islands a national place. Because of their part, the Uk remained, and the islands were administered as a crown colony. But until March 1982 both sides had accepted a process of negotiation and compromise to solve their claims. By the end of that month and even though negotiations were still in progress, the governing right-wing military services Junta in Argentina had taken advantage of a local dispute to stay its claim by power.
FALKLANDS INVASION
8. The ultimate crisis started out when scrap retailers landed on South Georgia Islands (approximately 1000nm from Falkland Islands) on 19 March 1982 by the Argentine Navy for the intended purpose of dismantling a disused old whaling manufacturer. The landings were made minus the authorization of the immigration authority in Grytviken, the settlement deal that offered as the dependency's "capital". Once ashore, their first action was to improve the Argentine flag and sing their nationwide anthem. Annoyed by their activity, the English dispatched HMS Stamina, an Antarctic study vessel with marines embarked, to eliminate the scrap retailers.
9. The dispatch of HMS Strength put the Argentine junta in a hard position. With Argentine individuals with an island stated as Argentine territory, any proceed to evacuate will be a serious blow to nationwide prestige, and would be looked at as an informal recognition of British isles sovereignty. Unwilling to consider that step, the junta withdrew a few of the employees to forestall the British isles while mailing their own expedition of marines to protect the scrap steel employees. When Argentina got determined over a course of armed service support for the contingent of scrap employees on the Georgia, it became aware that it would be in no position to keep a power in the Georgia's together. Thus, for an Argentine position in the distant Georgia to be tenable, Argentina could not afford to leaves the Malvinas/Falklands under English control. With confrontation imminent, the junta in Buenos Aires chose that the time was ripe to perform Operation Rosario, a long standing plan for the invasion and shoot of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. As March drew to a close, THE UK and Argentina were on a collision course with war.
10. Inside the Falkland Islands, media of the imminent invasion reached the governor-general on the evening of 1 1 April. With only a little contingent of Royal Marines, there is little he could do except to prepare for the unavoidable. The timing of the invasion was fortuitous for the reason that the garrison was briefly at double power, being along the way of turning over to a relieving push that week. The marines deployed to strategic locations to interdict the expected landings also to protect Authorities House, the couch of local government.
11. The Argentines were already off of the coastline of East Falkland when they intercepted radio transmissions that indicated the loss of the tactical delight they had hoped for. Not wishing to allow the islanders any moment to prepare defenses, the invasion's timetable was accelerated by a couple of hours, and the first Argentine commandos slipped ashore after midnight on 2 Apr. By early morning of 3 Apr, 2, 800 Argentineans arrived on the Falklands. The 80 strong United kingdom garrison surrendered after brisk fighting with each other, on the requests of the island's governor, Sir Rex Hunt, to avoid unnecessary lack of life.
12. South Georgia was invaded the following day, with a third Argentineans task group. The Royal Sea defenders put up fierce level of resistance, even downing an Argentine Puma, with a Carl Gustav anti-tank rocket and a support Allouette was damaged by machine-gun fire before the Sea surrendered.
13. Having didn't deter the Argentine invasion, Uk assembled an activity power to retake the hawaiian islands, under the codename 'Operation Corporate'. The war lasted for 72 times concerning 25, 000 United kingdom soldiers, functioning 8000 mls from their house bases, and over 12, 000 Argentina military were deployed under the safety of large air and maritime resources based mostly 400 mls away.
APPLICATION OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) IN CONFLICT
14. In general, both Argentine and British forces use minimum amount digital warfare techniques, mainly due to the limited equipment available in the employed forces. However some of EW job can be analyzed as defined in following paragraphs relating to EW basic principles of ESM, ECM and EPM.
Electronic Support Strategy (ESM)
15. As describe earlier, ESM will be the actions taken to seek out, intercept, identify and/or find sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat acceptance. A number of the EW equipment involved such as Radar Warning Device (RWR), Frequencies Analyzer, Missile Launcher Warner, Missile Strategy Warner and Laser beam Warner. The ESM equipment commonly available during that time was RWR and Rate of recurrence analyzer.
a. Regularity Analyzer. It is presumed that the occurrence analyzer for Sign Intelligent (SIGINT) onboard Royal Navy ships existed at the time but problems of coordination averted timely usage of vital information, especially supplying the caution of AM-39 Exocet anti ship missile problems. The British airborne frequency analyzer, of which normally offered with Airborne Early Alert (AEW) aircraft had not been available in Falkland conflict simply credited to insufficient an airplane carrier with conventional take off and landing facilities for Gannet AEW and insufficient long range land structured Nimrod AEW aircrafts.
b. RWR. Most of the aircrafts were not prepared with RWR. Really the only aircraft having the RWR ability was Harrier.
c. Missile Launcher/Approach Warner and Laser beam Warner. The warner tools were just lately developed and the technology was not commonly available in most of the combat airplane especially in the 3rd technology types that involved with Falkland conflict. Some of the plane mainly Argentine's was produced as early as in 1950s.
Electronic Counter Measure (ECM)
16. ECM is the activities taken up to prevent or reduce the hostile force's effective use of the electromagnetic range. The utilization of ECM by both causes will be examined in line with the sub-element within the ECM itself; productive onboard, passive onboard and passive off board.
17. Working onboard ECM utilization.
a. Noises or Electronic Jamming. RAF Vulcan bombers which attacked the Falklands on several situations transported Westinghouse AN/ALQ 101 dynamic ECM jammer which may have blocked out the Fledermaus radar employed by the Argentines for directing Roland surface to air missiles structured at Stanley airfield. It is significant to note that no Vulcan was lost on any of their strike missions.
b. Deception. There was no specific record stating the work of deception practices by both pushes. However it is thought that the deception might possibly be utilized by RAF Vulcan because the Westinghouse AN/ALQ 101 ECM pod was with the capacity of such occupation as well.
c. Neutralization. RAF Vulcan bomber formerly prepared with Martel air to surface anti radiation missile, then turned to US made AGM-45 Shrike Anti Radiation Missile (ARM) for a few operational and capacity reasons. Two Vulcan missions to hire the missile were aborted; firstly on 13th May 1982 scheduled to negative weather enroute and on 28th May 1982 anticipated to a in airline flight refueling probe was ruined. 31st May 1982, was the first successful anti-radar quest prepared with AGM-45A Shrike missiles. The primary target was a Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 long range 3D radar that the Argentine Air Push deployed to protect the airspace bordering the Falklands. For the missiles to work the targeted radar had to transmit until the missiles impacted. The first missile impacted 10 meters away from the target, causing minor blast harm to the wave-guide assemblage, but not disabling the radar. Fearing further strike, the Argentine operators used the easy counter-measure of turning their radar off stopping further damage. The AN/TPS-43 radar remained operational during the remaining discord. On 3rd June 1982, Shrike prepared Vulcan attacked and damaged a Skyguard radar fire-control radar of the army's Anti-aircraft battalion, eradicating 4 radar operators.
18. The only real passive onboard ECM feature which is the Signature Reduction Design was scarcely to be examined since the aircrafts mixed up in conflict were mainly from the 3rd technology design as defined earlier. For instance, the technology of radar absorbent materials and car paint, reflecting form and angle weren't maturely developed and was not in design top features of the third technology combat aircraft.
19. The passive off panel system such as chaff and flare were broadly employed by both factors. The electric towed and expandable decoys were newly developed rather than widely used even today. However, unconfirmed resources mentioned that simple made decoy has been utilized by British to counter the Exocet assault.
a. Chaff and Flare. The British Harrier was outfitted with ALE-40 chaff and flare dispenser. The English made large use of chaff to mistake enemy radar. Missing computerized dispensers, chaff was packed between aeroplanes and bomb cases so that when weaponry were released a chaff cloud was made to automatically protect the aeroplanes. The British believe this was effective against Argentine radar manipulated defenses. As for Argentine, chaff was placed in the airplane airbrake for an additional protection. Many of the Royal Navy surface ships also hired chaff to defend resistant to the Argentine's Exocet anti dispatch missile, but it is undiscovered if the chaff successfully countered an Exocet missile. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that the Atlantic Conveyour, the British isles merchant dispatch used for logistic acquired no chaff, nor have HMS Sheffield dispense the chaff it got. It has additionally been speculated that the Atlantic Conveyor was struck by a missile that was deflected from its intended target, a near by airplane carrier. The Atlantic Conveyor, in effect, became an excellent very expensive decoy.
b. Towed and expandable decoys. The technology of digital decoys was not yet developed. Even though, it was possible that some English helicopters towed a straightforward radar corner reflector, similar function with the radar reflector at the end of the runway to decoy the Exocet invasion. However, since no decoys themselves were struck by Exocet missiles, it had not been possible to guage the effectiveness of such decoy.
20. The Argentine Air Power did not use any "smart" weaponry, instead relied after dumb bombs or unguided rockets, except that the Exocet missiles were run by the Argentine Navy. The Argentine airplane didn't use any productive electronic countermeasures to degrade Royal Navy anti aircraft missiles apart from chaff. The normal Argentine technique was to hold off facing the missiles by traveling low or using the nearby land mass of the Falkland for ground masking. When possible, the 'Resolution Cell' tactic was used whereby multiple plane flying in limited tactical formations at low level attacking from various directions. Some Royal Navy fire control radar pcs onboard ships got difficulty separating two close targets. A lot of the RN flames control radar for the SAM such as Sea Dart was only capable of tracking two segregated targets simultaneously where going out of other Argentine aircrafts in development were untargeted.
Electronic Protection Measure (EPM)
21. EPM is the actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic variety, regardless of the hostile force's use of ECM. The elements covered by EPM are design for anti ECM, anti ECM training, emission control and emission security.
a. Design for anti ECM. HMS Coventry was the first RN dispatch to successfully open fire the ocean Dart missile through the issue, for example. The dispatch taken down an Argentine Puma helicopter traveling over one of the islands, demonstrating the ability of the Sea Dart semi active missile system to defeat ground muddle.
b. Anti ECM training. The Argentine's action of shutting down the air defence surveillance radar on Mount Tumbledown when being attacked by RAF AGM-45 Shrike HARM was a very good sign of well trained radar providers. Quick identification of such diagnosis by Shrike system and immediate action drill to switch off of the radar system had saved the radar site from being neutralized by Uk.
c. Emission Control. It is related to the above unsuccessful AGM-45 Shrike strike by RAF Vulcan on Argentine air defence security radar site at Mount Tumbledown. The AGM-45 Shrike radar homing missile was not passive but transmits own signal as it homes on rays of its focus on radar. This missile transmission can be detected even prior to the missile is launched. The enemy's most effective EPM is simply to shut the radar down, providing the missile nothing at all to home on of any radar emission.
d. Emission Security. There was no specific source stating any use of emission security in this conflict. Nonetheless it is believed that each force hired the emission security strategy such as station call signs, occurrence management and etc.
LESSONS LEARN AND RECOMMENDATIONS
22. The Falklands Campaign was at many respects unique. Though it is difficult to identify any single most significant lessons of any discord, this chapter will try to examine a number of important lessons that might have impact or highly relevant to Malaysian Armed Forces generally and RMAF specifically. This Falkland warfare has provided us with significant amounts of lessons to be "learned", "unlearnt" and "relearned".
23. Key element in United kingdom success in the South Atlantic issue was the skill, strength and quality of the individual servicemen. The need in battle for physical and mental toughness as well as high skills in techniques especially in EW was underscored in the negative environmental conditions of the Falklands. The English felt the procedure clearly demonstrated the worthiness of professional, highly trained and carefully chosen military and justified their goal on practical and demanding training whatsoever levels. The RMAF should posses the data of EW for the whole servicemen and EW operator must be experienced in their field and not forget the important of trained in RMAF.
24. Predominant among British isles protective problems was the egregious insufficient airborne early warning (AEW). The Royal Navy's past carrier Ark Royal with F-4 and Gannett AEW aeroplanes is a real asset. The British process force's very best vulnerability during the campaign was the lack of an airborne early on warning system. To meet the necessity for an AEW plane, the Royal Navy has successfully deployed several Sea Ruler helicopters outfitted with Searchwater Early Caution Radar. An AEW version could broaden the capability of amphibious ships or surface action groupings operating outside carrier protection. From this deficit, RMAF can learn that how important of the AEW & C aircraft to guarantee the successfulness of future warfare.
25. The Uk needed a system which would include able detection radar, a precise fire control system, an effective close-in missile and an electronic countermeasures suit. With this discord, it was proven that the chaff and digital warfare capabilities need to be improved.
26. The English determined that optical designation and assistance modes for his or her close in surface to air missile systems were necessary in coastal areas where landscape masking and land chaos degraded the radar managed operating modes. In like circumstances, high sea conditions, or when struggle damage or electric countermeasures defeat or degrade the radar ability, a visual, online backup function for close-in security weapons could be extremely important. Those systems lacking a visual setting should acquire one. Future weaponry systems should be designed with an optical less difficult system. RMAF should put into considerations to really have the same online backup system in future SAM's procurement.
CONCLUSION
27. Predicated on our research we can say that EW technique was not totally employed by both forces scheduled for some reason/circumstances. There have been lacks of EW equipment or property in Argentine makes. As for the British, these were capable but they were unable to bring all the EW advantage because of the distance of the AO which situated at Ascension Island about 4000 Kilometers from Falkland Island. For instance RAF Nimrod, AEW & C plane not fully implemented and in same time the conventional aircraft carrier, the Ark Royal had been decommissioned and the sole aircraft carrier they have will be the HMS HERMES and HMS INVINCIBLE to accomplish the V/STOL for Harrier's and Helicopters. Out of this Campaign we learn the value of EW in virtually any modern warfare and determine the success of any procedures. As conclusion, EW is an essential element as 4th dimension warfare beside land, sea and air vitality them selves. Even two opposing pushes having same EW capabilities, it depend which smartly useful to their gain.
