In beliefs, there a wide range of ways in which values can be justified, and thus categorised as knowledge. All are attained with scepticism, which can be arguments against the effectiveness of these methods. These scepticisms, if not properly dealt with, can make certain justifications seem insufficient, and therefore call into question the classification of values as knowledge. One particular method of insufficient justification is recognized as foundationalism, which includes not properly handled the scepticisms it faces.
Foundationalism uses the theory that all knowledge is based on what exactly are known as self-evident first guidelines or basic beliefs. These key points are true, sufficient to support other truths, and clear and distinctive. They are really non-inferential (aren't in relation to other things) and are justified non-inferentially (not justified by other things, or self-justified). They form the basis for many knowledge and all non-basic beliefs are inferred from them (Week 2, Reading 3, 99). Foundational justification works similar to a chain, where justification is non-reciprocal (perception A can either justify belief B or be justified by opinion B, but not both).
The Regress Problem is one of the major scepticisms of foundationalism. The situation is as follows: when justifying knowledge, the necessity for justification is infinite, and so there is an unending requirement of justification (Week 2, Reading 3, 105). Which means that justification would be impossible to attain, because every time a justification is made a fresh question or necessity immediately floors - leading to an infinite regress or the infinite necessity to justify beliefs. Foundationalists think that they have a remedy to this problem. They say, that in case a opinion (A) is justified by another opinion (B), wherein the other idea (B) is foundational or non-inferential (therefore is a basic belief), no further justification is necessary (Week 2, Reading 3, 107). Which means that every justified perception is the basic perception itself, or its chain of justification eventually ends with a basic belief. This method, theoretically, terminates the infinite regress of justification, and so effectively stops the Regress Problem. It depends on the actual fact that the regress is linear (similar to a chain, where a idea A is linked to a perception B, which is connected to a perception C, etc) and that there is your final, basic opinion that is without a doubt self-justified. All beliefs obtain justification in a linear fashion, until they reach a final, properly basic belief.
The major criticism with this reaction to the Regress Problem is so it declares a opinion to be justified within an limited way. The criticism uses the Epistemic Ascent Debate, which states the next: if an empirical perception (C) is properly basic, then it generally does not need any more justification. It does not need further justification because it is more than likely to be true, and values that are incredibly likely to be true need not be justified (Week 2, Reading 3, 108). The trouble with this argument is the fact that for perception (C) to be basic, it must depend on at least an added empirical notion (which is the belief that highly true values don't need further justification). Since it requires another belief, it is in fact a non-basic opinion. This argument is powerful, as it implies that the response foundationalism gives to one of its major scepticisms contradicts the foundationalist explanation of a basic belief. In addition, it questions the thought of properly empirical beliefs, which brings forth the question of if foundationalism can truly justify values regarding the external world. This demonstrates foundationalism will not dwelling address the Regress Problem properly and can be viewed as somewhat limited - as it cannot counter one of its most important scepticisms.
A second scepticism, built from the Epistemic Ascent Debate, attempts to confirm that we now have, in fact, no empirical beliefs that may be properly basic. This scepticism expresses that in foundationalism, basic empirical beliefs must be both epistemically justified and must be justified in order that they do not require justification from any empirical values. For these values to be epistemically justified, they require a reason to be considered true - like the fact they are highly likely. In turn, the average person doing the justifying must maintain possession of this reason. The only path for that each to be in possession of associated with to believe that associated with true, with premises justifying it. The condition with this is usually that the premises aiding this empirical opinion cannot be entirely a priori, and so at least one idea must be empirical. In other words, a basic empirical belief must be justified by another empirical idea, which contradicts this is of an effective basic belief altogether (Week 2, Reading 3, 108). Much like the argument contrary to the foundationalist reaction to the Regress Problem, this scepticism shows that properly empiric basic beliefs are not possible. This lack of properly empirical basic beliefs makes it impossible for foundationalism to justify values regarding the external world, and as such helps it be an insufficient method with which to justify knowledge.
You will find two responses foundationalism offers in counter-top: the externalist response and the internalist response. The externalist response rejects the theory that the average person must maintain possession of the reasoning behind why a simple notion is basic. Externalists claim that so long as the idea is generated in a trusted way, the individual who holds that belief does not need to make clear why they maintain it (Week 2, Reading 3, 109). The externalist response itself is seen as limited, as it does not explain a trusted process for developing a basic opinion, or specify the necessary conditions for a trusted process that occurs. Because of this it is quite obscure, and will not effectively counter the criticism above. The internalist response, on the other palm, agrees that the individual doing the justifying will need to have possession of the correct reasoning behind the justification to a reasonable level. However, they dispute that empirically basic beliefs are self-evident, and so require no premises to justify (Week 2, Reading 3, 110). This response, too, can be seen as insufficient - as the idea of self-evident knowledge is seen as wrong. The response will not make the distinction between sense perceptions and basic empirical knowledge, therefore does not take into account the simple fact that sense belief, although essential to gain empirical knowledge, is not knowledge itself. Because of this, the internalist response, as well, does not affectively counter the criticism. As foundationalists cannot effectively counter this anti-foundationalist discussion, the scepticism effectively demonstrates that foundationalism can be an limited way to justify knowledge, since it cannot provide any justified knowledge of the exterior world since empirical basic beliefs are impossible.
There are also two main categories of foundationalism, which in turn have their own scepticisms. The first category is traditional foundationalism. This also referred to as strong foundationalism, since it needs that all basic knowledge must be infallible (not capable of failure or almost any problem), incorrigible (true by just virtue to be), and self-evident (Week 2, Reading 3, 101). In this particular version of foundationalism, empirical values can be basic if indubitable or self-evident to the senses (Week 2, Reading 3, 103).
The most dominant critic of traditional foundationalism focuses on its definition of basic values. The requirements of infallibility, self-evidence, and incorrigibleness imply that there is very little knowledge available that can be considered properly basic (Week 2, Reading 3, 107). For this reason, there are extremely few beliefs where other values can be properly justified. These requirements do not produce a practical basis for knowledge, and don't yield a substantial amount of inferred knowledge or justified belief. The truth is, these requirements bring about scepticisms on the exterior world, perceptions, memory space beliefs, other imagination, etc. Therefore, it could be seen that traditional foundationalism is not an satisfactory method with which knowledge can be justified, as it actually produces more scepticism than it counters.
The second category is contemporary foundationalism. This modest foundationalism removes the requirement that basic truths be infallible, and has allowed the theory that proper basicality depends upon the average person (i. e. whether or not a truth is basic is dependant on your own private viewpoint). In this version of foundationalism, any basic beliefs can be proven bogus, and there are only some self-evident and incorrigible truths (such as simple mathematics, truths of reasoning, and the cogita: "I think, therefore I am") (Week 2, Reading 3, 104). This version of foundationalism does not allow empirical beliefs to be considered self-evident and incorrigible, as they are vunerable to too much possible question (Week 2, Reading 3, 105).
The most dominant critic of modern day foundationalism targets the justification caused by the technique. As this form of foundationalism compromises the effectiveness of the essential knowledge (as it no more should be infallible, self-evident, and incorrigible), it could be said that the producing justification is no longer as particular or sturdy as it ought to be (Week 2, Reading 3, 107). As the basic beliefs are now subject to uncertainty, the non-basic beliefs justified by them are therefore also subject to doubt, resulting in weak values. The few self-evident and incorrigible truths (such as mathematics) that could be considered satisfactory enough do not provide a large enough bottom part with which beliefs can be based mostly. Furthermore, the fact that empirical values aren't self-evident and incorrigible means that there cannot possibly be any infallible knowledge of the external world. Therefore, modern day foundationalism is also no adequate method of justification, as it results either weak justifications, or a restricted amount of strong justifications.
There are several scepticisms that argue against foundationalism, and that weaken its capability to justify knowledge properly. These scepticisms are the Regress Problem, the shortcoming to justify knowledge of the external world, and quarrels against both classical and contemporary foundationalism. However, foundationalism will not affectively counter these scepticisms, therefore it can be an inadequate method with which knowledge can or should be justified.
