Virtue ethics is person rather than action founded; it generally does not focus on activities being right or wrong but rather how to be always a good person. Virtue ethics looks at the virtue or moral character of the person undertaking an action, somewhat than at moral duties or guidelines, or the results of particular actions. Essentially, Virtue ethics provides guidance as to the sort of characteristics and behaviours a good person will seek to accomplish; it looks at why is a good person and the characteristics or virtues that make them good. Therefore, the immediate answer would be that virtue ethics is useless for guiding action; an ethical system centred on the average person person and what it means to be human does not provide clear direction on how to do something or behave in moral dilemmas. However, presumably somebody who is very virtuous would, because of this, really know what to do in certain circumstances, and we could consider these virtues or characteristics that a virtuous person has as the right guide for action.
Like Plato, Aristotle also positioned eudaimonia or enjoyment as the ultimate and overriding end of human being activity and for that reason goes on to go over the character qualities of someone who is going to achieve eudaimonia. Like Plato and the Cardinal Virtues, Aristotle found two types of virtues: intellectual virtues that are produced by training and education, and moral virtues developed by habit. Aristotle recognized nine intellectual virtues, intelligence being the most important, and suggested that by using our reason we are all with the capacity of being virtuous. However these virtues, including prudence, justice, fortitude, courage and so on, and the overall notion of being virtuous is a lttle bit like a participating in musical tool- it requires coaching and then utilized before it could be played well. Aristotle did, however, suggest that while all people do have the potential to build up these moral and intellectual virtues, only few will actually achieve this.
Essentially, these traditional virtues themselves are unproductive in providing clear guidance for action. A person being courageous or simply, for example, perhaps does not have any use or relevance for someone who is considering an abortion. Advice for action must be somewhat overall, or if not, atleast relative to certain situations and circumstances; consequences might need to be looked at and duties might need to be taken into account. Virtues ethics, being centred on the person and just what a person should become, appears to ignore many of these concepts and instead only principles certain characteristics that produce a person Лgood. Being truly a virtuous person is not necessarily clear guidance to use it. While it could be conceivable a completely virtuous person would therefore really know what to do or how to act, it still seems illogical to suggest the utilization of virtues or characteristics of an individual in an effort to determine how to do something. Additionally you need to consider that if, as Aristotle recommended, just a few will achieve these virtues, then even aspiring to become a virtuous person seems a waste material of time.
The fact that there is no general agreement on the particular virtues are shows that Virtue ethics is totally pointless itself, whereby the virtues that are susposed to profit humans are themselves not absolute or common. Most virtue theorists say that there surely is a common group of virtues that all humans would benefit from, rather than a set for differing types of people. When considering guidance for action, it seems reasonable that everyone should abide by the same rules to ensure that everyone is behaving in a way that is perhaps universally acceptable or expected. Because the lists of virtues vary from differing times, different societies and ethnicities and so forth, virtue ethics, if common for many humans, will not provide clear guidance on how to proceed in moral dilemmas. Many people are different, in case action was to be sought from virtue ethics, then essentially anyone could do what they wanted to if it appears to make sure they are a virtuous person, even if it was frowned after by others, i. e. being courageous or having magnificence. Eventually, Virtue ethics is not culturally comparative and agent-centred and therefore does not have anything to do with decision making or guiding action.
Phlippa Ft. suggested that virtues benefit the individual by resulting in flourishing which virtues are best for us by helping us correct harmful human passions and tempatations. However, flourishing and correction of harmful individuals actvities has no relevance to action. There is perhaps no denying that Virtue ethics does provide general instruction on how to be always a good person, but being a good person does not have any relevence to a person who faces the issue of telling a lay to save lots of an innocent life, for example. A virtue ethicist would target less on lying down in virtually any particular occasion, but instead think about what a decision to see a lie or not inform a lie said about the folks figure and moral behavior. When someone must decide to notify a rest or not, there is no used in them considering what it says about them as a person. Virtue ethics moves away from any sense of obligation or opinion, and completely ignores the action, yet when considering clear guidance for action, it is the action itself that always matters.
Rosaline Hursthouse defends Virtue ethics and cases that virtues are virtues because they help a person achieve eudaimonia, therefore living a virtuous life is a good thing for a human being. For Hursthouse, being truly a virtuous person is the most reliable path to flourishing. Hursthouse also endeavors to handle the criticism that Virtue ethics provides no guidance in moral dilemmas- not by sharing with us what sort of virtuous person would take action, but by displaying what sort of virtuous person would think about a moral problem. However, this process still seems to ignore the actual action itself and the need for guidance. What sort of virtuous person thinks about a moral problem is not a clear guide for action. Presumably somebody who is a virtuous person may be seen as a role model for others, but not necessarily to use it. Different individuals are faced with completely different dilemmas, therefore advice or direction is not rooted with the characteristics and skills of another person who is considered virtuous.
Robert Louden lifted the challenge that Virtue ethics cannot be put on moral dilemmas. He defined the major criticism that it can help folks who are facing an emergency because it does not give any clear rules for action. He argued that it is difficult to work through the virtuous response to stem-cell research or abortion, for example. Essentially, Virtue ethics does not give us an concrete information or answers and instead says that it's more a matter for the practical wisdom of the individual facing the problem. Louden also highlighted that it is difficult to even determine who's virtuous, as serves may appear virtuous externally but may not have good motives, and vice versa. Eventually, Virtue ethics does not accommodate protection under the law and obligations, and so is perhaps limited for coping with big issues or decision making; it generally does not seem to truly have a view on what makes an function right and incorrect.
Overall, Virtue ethics is inadequate, presenting no clear information to use it. Many may consider the actual fact that Virtue ethics will not count on any method to work out what we ought to do and instead focuses on the type of person we live nearly as good thing, allowing room for feelings and commitments, friends and family. However, it is this that seems to make Virtue ethics a worthless method of action; Virtue ethics does not provide any guidelines or guides and instead origins everything in the person and their characteristics, but being truly a virtuous person will not lead to concrete answers on what to do in compex situations. Decisions about abortion, euthanasia or hereditary anatomist, for example, will not result from us being virtuous or good people.
